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Abstract. Human reasoning applies argumentation patterns to draw
conclusions about a particular subject. These patterns represent the
structure of the arguments in the form of argumentation schemes which
are useful in AI to emulate human reasoning. A type of argument schema
is that what allow to analyze the similarities and differences between two
arguments, to find a solution to a new problem from an already known
one. Researchers in the heavily studied field of analogies in discourse have
recognized that there is not a full and complete definition to indicate
when two arguments are considered analogous. Our proposal presents
an initial attempt to formalize argumentation schemes based on analo-
gies, considering a relationship of analogy between arguments. This will
contribute to the area increasing such schemes usefulness in Artificial
Intelligence (AI), since it can be implemented later in Defeasible Logic
Programming (DeLP).
1 Introduction
The ability to solve problems based on previous experience can be considered as
an useful tool to develop and integrate to critical thinking. The act of thinking
critically involves combining previous experiences with new experiences, finding
patterns that follow those experiences, and considering the relationships among
those patterns.
In the process of argumentation, information plays a fundamental role in
supporting a point of view, making decisions, presenting the views of others,
and solving new problems using past experiences. The human-like mechanism
developed in computational argumentation research has made a significant con-
tribution to the formalization of common sense reasoning and implementation of
useful systems. In a general sense [15,7,2,14], argumentation can be associated
with the interactive process where arguments for and against conclusions are
offered, with the purpose of determining which conclusions are acceptable. Sev-
eral argument-based formalisms have emerged, some of them based on Dung’s
seminal work called Abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AF)[5], others using
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non-abstract or concrete forms of building arguments [1,7,6,12] leading to the
application of these systems in many areas such as legal reasoning, recommender
systems and multi-agent systems.
For Walton [18,17], Argumentation Schemes offer the possibility of represent-
ing the reasoning mechanisms on a semi-formal way, thus helping in the task of
characterizing the inferential structures of arguments used in everyday discourse,
particularly in special contexts such as scientific argumentation and AI systems
in general. These simple devices capture the patterns of thought and expression
from natural language, and contain questions that govern each of these patterns.
A particular type of argumentation scheme corresponds to Argument from
Analogy, which represents a very common form of everyday human reasoning.
In these schemes, two cases are analyzed for similarities and differences between
them, using a form of inductive inference from a particular to a particular where
the similarities between the cases lead to postulate a further similarity not yet
confirmed; for instance, “I have recently read H.G.Well’s ‘The Time Machine’
and I liked it. Therefore, I will also like ‘The War of the Worlds’ by the same
author”. It should also evaluate if the perceived differences do not undermine
the similarities between them. The argumentation from analogy allows to solve
a new case based on already solved cases, or put it in a different way, to use
previous experiences to consider a new case.
In this work, we will propose an extension of the abstract argumentation
frameworks which allows to represent analogy between arguments determining
the similarity degree or difference degree between them. This extension will be
called Analogy Argumentation Framework (AnAF ). This extension is motivated
in the use of inferential mechanisms of argumentation based in the idea of argu-
ment from analogy that, as we said, are used in everyday situations in which a
conclusion is obtained based on previous observations.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 is presented a brief introduc-
tion to argumentation schemes. Then, in Section 3 we introduce the concept of
analogy. In Section 4, we present an introduction to argumentation framework.
The core contribution of the paper is presented in Section 5 called as Analogy
Argumentation Framework. Finally, in Section 6 we present the related work as-
sociated with the central issue of the work, and in Section 7 we conclude and
propose future works.
2 Argumentation Schemes
There are several argumentation schemes proposed by Walton [18] applied to
different areas such as in the legal and scientific communities, and in learning
environments. These schemes are gaining importance in the field of AI, partic-
ularly because they allow the representation of defeasible arguments, i.e., that
can be refuted by who receives the argument, who thinks critically in relation
to a given position. There are various argumentation schemes proposed by Wal-
ton [20], such as arguments coming from experts, from popular opinion, or from
signs, among others.
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In this paper, we focus on the Argumentation from Analogy Scheme. This
scheme considers two cases C1 and C2 assessing the similarities and differences
between them. The defeasible character is introduced by the specific differences
between the cases C1 and C2. Walton defined three critical questions that are
appropriate for using the scheme of argument from analogy:
1. Are there differences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the force
of the similarity cited?
2. Is the feature A true (false) in C1?
3. Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which the feature A
is false (true)?
In the words of Walton [18]: “In general, the first critical question for the argu-
ment from analogy tends to be the most important one to focus on when eval-
uating arguments from analogy. If one case is similar to another in a certain
respect, then that similarity gives a certain weight of plausibility to the argument
from analogy. But if the two cases are dissimilar in some other respect, citing
this difference tends to undermine the plausibility of the argument. So arguments
from analogy can be stronger or weaker, in different cases.”
In a recent work [19], Walton has analyzed different possibilities for this
type of schema and has offered his understanding of how the schema integrates
with the usage of argument from classification and the argument from precedent
when applied in case-based reasoning by the use of a dialogue structure; below,
we will summarily discuss these ideas. Next, we will focus on a detailed study
of the concept of analogy, and define a relation of analogy between argument
entities.
3 The Concept of Analogy
The term analogy has been widely studied as to their meaning and usage.
Hesse [8], argues that the word is self-explanatory, and that two objects or situ-
ations are similar if they share some properties and differ in others. Walton [19]
agrees with this perspective adding that two things are similar when they are
visibly similar or they look similar. As to how to determine when two arguments
are similar, Hesse uses a comparison between arguments based on the use of
mathematical proportions. On the other hand, in a refinement of Hesse’s idea,
Walton points out that it is not easy to clearly define the comparison between
arguments, as this requires interpreting the similarities and differences between
them at various levels.
Offering another view, Carbonell [3] proposes a technique based on how we
solve problems. This technique takes into account information from previous ex-
perience, which is useful for solving a new problem, as long as both occur in
similar contexts; that is, the context of the problem determines a set of con-
straints under which the proposed solution is feasible. In [16], Sowa argues that
it is possible to make a comparison between arguments, establishing a function
of similarity or correspondence between them; and, by using another function,
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referred to as the estimation function, it is possible to find the differences be-
tween the arguments. In a parallel effort, in [4] Cecchi et al. characterized and
formalized relationships that capture the behaviour of a preference criterion
among arguments; while this does not refer specifically to arguments from anal-
ogy, shows the usefulness in approaching the analogy between two arguments as
a binary relationship.
These questions have received different answers and remains the focus of dif-
ferent research lines. Briefly, two objects or situations are analogous when they
have some similar properties, maintaining other properties different. The simi-
larity is then related to the properties shared between two objects or situations
being compared. Following previous work, our proposal is to consider the anal-
ogy between two arguments A and B relaying on the following items defined
next.
Definition 1 (Analogy Elements). Given a set AR of arguments, we intro-
duce:
1. a constraint set, denoted as ∆, contains the features governing the comparison of
arguments in a given situation.
2. a similarity degree between two arguments A and B, denoted as α∆(A,B), as a
function: α∆ : AR×AR→ [0, 1],
3. a difference degree between two arguments A and B, denoted as β∆(A,B), as a
function: β∆ : AR×AR→ [0, 1],
furthermore, for all A,B ∈ AR, it holds (1) α∆(A,B) = α∆(B,A), (2) β∆(A,B) =
β∆(B,A), and (3) α∆(A,B) + β∆(A,B) = 1.
The set ∆ specifies the features that are significant to consider to establish
whether two arguments are analogous or not. The content of this set is heavily
dependent on the domain where the arguments are considered; thus, this is a
semantic concept from which we will abstract away introducing the tools that
will handle these features building the infrastructure for arguing from analogy. In
the same way as ∆, the two functions α∆ and β∆ are dependent on the domain
of application; therefore, although they remain unspecified in the formalization,
a concrete definition must be given when implementing the framework. It is
important to remark that in this initial approach, as the definition establishes,
there is no difference in comparing A with B or B with A. This decision of not
assigning preference to the features is a simplifying one, taken in the spirit of
analyzing the simplest problem. In the future evolution of these ideas, we will
to consider some form of preference over ∆’s elements, and this preference will
help in the comparison in a natural way introducing different possibilities.
Naturally, if between the arguments being compared the similarity degree is
greater than the difference degree under the constraint set, it can be considered
that the arguments are analogous; otherwise, differences prevail and they are
considered as not analogous. Observe that the similarity degree and the differ-
ence degree are mutually dependent, e.g., if the similarity degree between two
arguments is 0.7, then the difference degree between them is 0.3. The following
definition formalizes the analogy relation between arguments.
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Definition 2 (Analogy Relation). Let AR be a set of arguments and ∆ be a
constraint set. An analogy relation, denoted Γ∆, is defined as a binary relation on
AR under the constraint set ∆, where the relation Γ∆ is such that Γ∆ ⊆ AR×AR
and satisfies the constrains of ∆, where (A,B) ∈ Γ∆ iff α∆(A,B) > β∆(A,B),
i.e., the similarity degree between them is greater than their difference degree.
From the previous definition of analogy relation Γ∆, we can establish the
following properties hold for analogy when arguments are compared over the
same features or properties:
– Reflexive: A Γ∆ A. Any argument is analogous to itself.
– Symmetric: If A Γ∆ B, then B Γ∆ A. The analogy relation is symmetric by defini-
tion, i.e., the analogy between arguments is established from the similarity between
both, under a constraint set. This explains why the analogy relation is symmetric
and is not asymmetrical.
– Transitive: If A Γ∆ B and B Γ∆ C, then A Γ∆ C. The arguments A and B
are similar according to the constraint set defined, the same occurs between the
arguments B and C, thus A and C are similar and relation is transitive.
That is, the analogy relation between arguments under a given constraint set
is an equivalence relation under that constraint set, and each equivalence class
will contain all the arguments that have identical features in the frame of ∆.
Also notice that the analogy relation is not equality since two argument that
are analogous under a constraint set might no be analogous under a different
constraint set. The definition of the analogy relation between arguments under
a constraint set just introduced, will allow us to reformulate the questions for
guiding the argumentation from analogy scheme, in the following way:
1. Are A and B analogous? Is (A,B) ∈ Γ∆?
2. Are there differences between A and B that would tend to undermine the force of
the similarity cited? Is α∆(A,B) > β∆(A,B)?
4 Abstract Argumentation
Dung [5] introduced Abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AF) as an abstrac-
tion of a defeasible argumentation system. In an AF, an argument is an abstract
entity with unspecified internal structure, and its role in the framework is solely
determined by the attack relation it keeps with other arguments; thus, an AF is
defined by a set of arguments and the attack relation defined over it.
Definition 3 (Argumentation Framework [5]). An argumentation frame-
work (AF) is a pair described as 〈AR,Attacks〉, where AR is a set of arguments,
and the binary relation Attacks ⊆ AR×AR.
When it happens that (A,B) ∈ Attacks, we say that A attacks B, or that
B is attacked by A. Likewise, extending the relation of attack, we will say that
the set S attacks C when there exists at least an argument A ∈ S, such that
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(A,C) ∈ Attacks. Given an AF, intuitively A ∈ AR is considered acceptable if
A can be defended of all its attackers (arguments) with other arguments in AR;
this is formalized in the following definitions [5].
Definition 4 (Acceptability). Let AF = 〈AR,Attacks〉 be a framework.
– A set S ⊆ AR is said conflict-free if there are no arguments A,B ∈ S such that
(A,B) ∈ Attacks.
– A ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to S ⊆ AR iff for each B ∈ AR, if B attacks A
then there exists C ∈ S such that (C,B) ∈ Attacks; in such case it is said that B
is attacked by S.
– A conflict-free set S is admissible iff each argument in S is acceptable with respect
to S.
– An admissible set S ⊆ AR is a complete extension of AF iff S contains every
argument acceptable with respect to S.
– A set S ⊆ AR is a grounded extension of AF iff S is a complete extension that is
minimal with respect to set inclusion.
We will now extend the Dung’s framework introducing the possibility of taking
in consideration the similarities and differences between arguments.
5 Analogy Argumentation Framework
Recently, the field of application of argumentation has been expanding, with
the interesting addition of the research on argumentation schemes; however, still
there is need to further formalize the structure of these schemes. Here, we will
make a first approximation to this formalization through extending AFs to Anal-
ogy Argumentation Frameworks (AnAF), introducing the consideration of the
analogy between arguments in the well-known argument from analogy scheme,
by representing the notions of similarities and differences between arguments.
When considering analogy among the set of arguments is natural, and intu-
itively appealing, to requiere two things: (1) that arguments that are analogous
do not attack each other, and (2) if an argument attacks another, then any ar-
gument analogous to the attacker should be an attacker to same argument. This
can easily formalized by taking advantage of the analogy relation that happens
to be an equivalence relation. Let [A] = {X ∈ AR |XΓ∆A} be the class of
arguments equivalent to A and ARΓ∆ the quotient set of AR by Γ∆.
Definition 5 (Nonconflicting Class). Given an AF = 〈AR,Attacks〉, and
an analogy relation Γ∆ defined over AR. Let [A] ∈ ARΓ∆ , [A] is said to be
a nonconflicting class iff there is no pair of arguments X,Y ∈ [A] such that
(X,Y ) ∈ Attacks. The AR is said to be Γ∆-conformant iff all classes in the
quotient set ARΓ∆ are non-conflicting.
Definition 6 (Class Attack Relation). Given an AF = 〈AR,Attacks〉, and
an analogy relation Γ∆ defined over AR. Let [A] = {X ∈ AR |XΓ∆A} be the
class of arguments equivalent to A and ARΓ∆ the quotient set of AR by Γ∆.
We say that Attacks is a class attack relation over ARΓ∆ iff when A,B ∈ AR,
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and (A,B) ∈ Attacks it happens that every argument X ∈ [A] attacks every
argument Y ∈ [B].
Definition 7 (AnAF). Given AF = 〈AR,Attacks〉, and an analogy relation
Γ∆ defined over AR. An Analogy Argumentation Framework (AnAF ) is a 3-
tuple Θ = 〈AR,Attacks, Γ∆〉 where AR is a set of arguments, and Attacks is a
Γ∆-conformant, class attack relation.
These definitions follow the intuitions expressed in (1) and (2) above.
Given an AnFA, an argument A is considered Analogy-acceptable if it can
be defended of all its attackers (arguments) with other arguments in AR.
Definition 8 (Analogy Acceptability). Let Θ = 〈AR,Attacks, Γ∆〉 be an
AnAF . The acceptability of S ⊆ AR is given by the following conditions:
– S ⊆ AR is an Analogy-Conflict-Free set iff there are no arguments A,B ∈ S such
that (A,B) ∈ Attacks.
– A ∈ AR is an Analogy-Acceptable with respect to S ⊆ AR iff for each B ∈ AR, if
B attacks A then exist C ∈ S such that B is attacked by C.
– An Analogy-Conflict-Free set S is Analogy-Admissible iff each argument in S is
Analogy-Acceptable with respect to S.
– An Analogy-Admissible set S ⊆ AR is an Analogy-complete extension of Θ iff S
contains each argument that is Analogy-Acceptable with respect to S.
– S ⊆ AR is the Analogy-grounded extension of Θ iff S is an Analogy-complete
extension that is ⊆-minimal.
Example 1 Consider a scenario where an agent must decide whether it is riskier
to invest in a real estate property or to invest in gold bullion, to reach a decision
the agent ponders these arguments:
A: I should invest my savings in real estate because they do not depreciate quickly, and
this leads financial safety.
B: It is better to invest in gold bullion because it does not deteriorate, and it does not
require maintenance as real estate does. It is not wise to invest in real estate because
they lose value in many ways.
C: Investing in gold bullion is expensive because you have to store them in a safekeeping
place. Land does not deteriorate, does not depreciate fast, does not require a place to
store and provide financial reinsurance. I should not invest in gold bullion.
D: Buying land is a good way to invest whenever you carefully look for a place. Land
does not devalue easily.
E: Buying foreign currency is an investment of unpredictable results because it depends
on the global economy.
Let Θ = 〈AR,Attacks, Γ∆〉 be an AnAF , where:AR = {A;B;C;D;E}, Attacks =
{(B,A); (C,B); (B,D)} Γ∆ = {(A,C); (D,A); (D,C); (C,A); (A,D); (C,D)}, and
∆ is “Invest the savings into something that is not quickly devalued”, and the
similarity and difference degrees are represented in table 1.
Some of analogy-conflict-free set are: S1 = {A}, S2 = {A;C}, S3 = {A;C;D},
S4 = {B} and S5 = {B}. Note, for example, the set S6 = {A;E} is a conflict-
free, but is not an analogy-conflict-free given that there is not an analogy relation
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(B,A) = 0
(B,A) = 1
(C,B) = 0
 (C,B) = 1
(A,E) = 0
 (A,E) = 1
(B,D) = 0
 (B,D) = 1
(C,E) = 0
(C,E) = 1
(A,C) = 1
(A,C) = 0
(D,A) = 1
(D,A) = 0
(B,E) = 0
(B,E) = 1
(D,C) = 1
(D,C) = 0
(E,D) = 0
 (E,D) = 1
Fig. 1: Coefficients Table
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Analogy Relation 
References:  
Attacks Relation 
Fig. 2: Example for AnAF
between them on the constraint set considered.
The argument A ∈ AR is Analogy-Acceptable with respect to S3, since B ∈ AR
and (B,A), (C,B) ∈ Attacks, and C ∈ S3. Additionally, (C,B) /∈ Γ∆ and
(A,C) ∈ Γ∆. The argument B ∈ AR is not Analogy-Acceptable because (C,B) ∈
Attacks and there is no an argument that attacks C.
The set S3 is an Analogy-Admissible because each argument in S3 is Analogy-
Acceptable in S3. Additionally, S3 is an Analogy-complete extension of Θ, and
S3 is an Analogy-grounded extension of Θ.
6 Related Works
Few studies exist formalizing the argumentation schemes proposed by Walton.
However, there are several extensions of Dung’s framework that are inspiring
for this paper. Prakken [12] proposed Argumentation Systems with Structured
Arguments, which used the structure of arguments and external preference in-
formation to define the a defeat relation. In this paper, we use the term “defeat”
instead of the “attack”, because defeat allows to considerer an attack relation
plus preferences. Regarding argumentation schemes, Prakken [13] proposes that
modeling reasoning using argumentation schemes necessarily involves developing
a method combining issues of non-monotonic logic and dialogue systems. Nielsen
et al. [11] claim that Dung’s framework is not enough to represent argumentation
systems with joint attacks, and they generalize it allowing a set of arguments to
attack on a single argument. Modgil [10] also extends Dung’s framework, pre-
serving abstraction and expressing the preference between arguments. To do this,
incorporates a second attack relation that characterizes the preference between
arguments. Regarding to preference relation between arguments Cecchiet al. [4]
defined this as a binary relation considering two particular criteria, specificity
and equi-specificity, together with priorities between rules, defining preferred
arguments and incomparable arguments.
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In regards specifically to formalizing argumentation schemes, Hunter [9] pre-
sented a framework for meta-reasoning about object-level arguments allowing
the presentation of richer criteria for determining whether an object-level ar-
gument is warranted. These criteria can use meta-information corresponding to
the arguments, including the proponents and their provenances, and an axiom-
atization using this framework for reasoning about the appropriated conduct of
the experts that introduce them. He shows how it can conform to some pro-
posed properties for expert-based argumentation describing a formal approach
to modelling argumentation providing ways to present arguments and counter-
arguments, and evaluating which arguments are, in a formal sense, warranted.
He proposed a way to augment representation and reasoning with arguments at
the object-level with a meta-level system for reasoning about the object-level
arguments and their proponents. The meta-level system incorporates axioms for
raising the object-level argumentation to the meta-level (an important case is
to capture when an argument is a counterargument for another argument), and
meta-level axioms that specify when proponents are appropriated for arguments.
The meta-level system is an argumentation system to the extent that it supports
the construction and comparison of meta-level arguments and counterarguments.
7 Conclusions and future works
Human reasoning applies argumentation patterns to draw conclusions about a
particular subject. These patterns represent the structure of the arguments in
the form of argumentation schemes which are useful in AI to emulate human
reasoning. Argumentation schemes are a semiformal way of representing reason-
ing patterns. In this paper we presented an extension of Dung’s frameworks,
called Analogy Argumentation Framework (AnAF), which allows to consider the
similarity and difference degrees between two arguments in the context of an
analogy relation. The analogy between arguments allows to approach the so-
lution of a new case based on already solved cases, or put it in another way,
to re-use previous experiences. The analogy relation represents in this proposal
a form of a preference between arguments. As work in progress, we analyzed
and studied the extensions of the classical semantics proposed by Dung within
this new framework. It seems also necessary to formalize other argumentation
schemes [20].
As future work, we will develop an implementation of the application of
AnAF in the existing Defeasible Logic Programing system 1 as a basis. For
doing that we will decrease the level of abstraction studying the internal struc-
ture of the arguments. To get the similarity degree between arguments involves
implementing a mapping function between them, subject to a given constraint
set, while determining the difference degree requires to implement a function to
estimate differences between the arguments in question, subject to the same con-
straint set. The similarities or differences between arguments is in fact to compare
premises, conclusions or inference mechanisms between arguments. The result-
1 See http://lidia.cs.uns.edu.ar/delp
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ing implementation will be exercised in different domains requiring to model
analogy between arguments.
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